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DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND DUAL SOVEREIGNTY: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution reflects the
deeply rooted fear and abhorrence of a governmental power which
allows an individual to be subjected to multiple prosecution for the
same offense. It provides: "No person . . .shall .. .be subject for the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... '"
This amendment encompasses both the practice of the common law2
and of the international law3 in allowing the plea of autrefoits acquit,
or former acquittal, when a defendant had been tried previously in
another jurisdiction. Yet in 1959, the Supreme Court in Bartkus v.
llinois and Abbate v. United States5 developed a rule that the Con-
stitution does not prevent a federal or state reprosecution of an indi-
vidual for an offense arising out of the same act. This was done, with-
out denying the abhorrence of multiple prosecutions by our system,
because a majority of the Court felt that the appropriate function of
our federal system requires the application of a dual sovereignty princi-
ple. The rationale of the dual sovereignty principle being that because
the laws of both state and the federal governments, as two sovereigns,
were applicable, the same act produced two offenses, and therefore
an individual could not be placed in jeopardy for the "same" offense.
The following discussion will focus upon the validity of the Bartkus
and Abbate rationale by considering the historical perspective of the
problem, the weakness of the arguments presented in its defense, and
1. U. S. CoNsT. amend. V.
2. See, e.g., Fisher, Double Jeopardy, Two Sovereignties, and the Intruding Constitu-
tion, 28 U. Cmn. L. Rnv. 591 (1961); Grant, Successive Prosecutions by State and
Nation: Common Law and British Empire Comparisons, 4 U.C.LA. Rav. 1 (1956);
Harrison, Federalism and Double Jeopardy: A Study in the Frustration of Human
Rights, 17 U. MiAmi L. REv. 306 (1963).
3. Franck, An International Lawyer Looks at the Bartkus Rule, 34 N.Y.U. L. REv.
1096 (1959). The Supreme Court accepted this rule in United States v. Furlong, 18
U. S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820) in dealing with a prosecution for piracy.
4. 359 U. S. 121 (1959).
5. 359 U. S. 187 (1959).
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the subsequent change in the jurisprudential tenor of the Court. From
this discussion the conclusion will be drawn that Bartkus and Abbate
should be overruled.
HIsTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
As one of the oldest restraints on governmental power known to
-the western legal tradition, the double jeopardy prohibition has been
traced to the Hebrew Talmud and has found expression in the Conti-
nental and English system as well as having been part of the Roman
and Canon law." In 1759, Blackstone was to suggest that the "plea of
the autrefoits aoquit, or a former acquittal, is grounded on this universal
maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought
into jeopardy of his life, more than once, for the same offence." ' This
"universal maxim" has been established in English precedents since
Roy v. Thoma in 1664, Rex v. Hutchinson,° 1678, and King v.
Roche," in 1775 and has been described as a part of all advanced systems
of law.'2
It is, therefore, not surprising that after the introduction of the doc-
trine by this country's earliest settlers, and after having become deeply
engrained in the conscience of its people,"3 that a double jeopardy pro-
vision was incorporated in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution in
1791.14 The provision having been adopted in its present form, after
6. Newman, Double Jeopardy and the Problem of Successive Prosecution: A Sug-
gested Solution, 34 S. CAL. L. REv. 252-55 (1961).
7. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COmmENTARIES BooK *335; W. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF ThM CRO-N
515-529 (8th ed. 1824).
8. Although, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter asserted in Bartkus, there was some
question as to the early English cases due to confusing reporting, still it is clear that
those cases have always been treated as establishing the principle. Pontikes, Dual
Sovereignty and Double Jeopardy: A Critique of Bartkus v. Illinois and Abbate v.
United States, 14 W. REs. L. REv. 700, 705 (1963). See also Fisher, supra note 2, at
605-06; Grant, The Lanza Rule of Successive Prosecutions, 32 CoLuM. L. REv. 1309,
1316-29 (1932).
9. 82 Eng. Rep. 1043 (K.B. 1664) (subsequent prosecution barred in an adjoining
English county after an acquittal of a felony in Wales).
10. Reported in Burrows v. Jemino, 93 Eng. Rep. 815 (K.B. 1726) (an acquittal of a
felony in Portugal barred a prosecution in England).
11. 168 Eng. Rep. 169 (Cr. Cas. 1775) (dictum that a prior trial in the Cape of Good
Hope was a bar to English prosecution).
12. AmERICAw LAw INsTutrrE, DOUBLE JEOPARDY 7 (1935) (introductory note).
13. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 155 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting).
14. All but five states expressly recognize the principle in their constitutions, with
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the first Congress, in 1789, had rejected an amendment to the provi-
sion which would have restricted the double jeopardy protection to
federal offenses.' 5
In the early years of our country, the courts were to deal with the
inherent conflicts between the states and the union in the area of con-
current jurisdiction. Initial considerations were given to those areas
between the two governments where their laws were in substantial
conflict, 16 a problem to which the Constitution 7 and its framers' 8 had
addressed themselves in some detail. But more relevant to this dis-
cussion, the problem arose, particularly in the criminal law, as to the
laws of duplication of the two jurisdictions or "dual sovereigns." The
problem presented itself as whether to declare unconstitutional succes-
sive prosecutions and thereby protect the individual, as the common
law had done, or to uphold a dual sovereignty doctrine in order that
one sovereign would not interfere with the administration of the other's
criminal laws. Before 1847, the case law in the United States had given
strong indications that it would oppose successive prosecutions and fol-
low the former course.'9
Houston v. Moore2 was the first significant comment by the Su-
preme Court in the dual sovereignty area. Houston, as a member of
the Pennsylvania militia, was prosecuted under a Pennsylvania statute
for refusing to serve under order of the state's governor in compliance
with a requisition by the President of the United States. Penalties were
defined in the Act of Congress of 1795. In answer to the argument that
"[t] he exercise of this jurisdiction by a state court-martial would either
oust the United States courts of their jurisdiction, or might subject the
alleged delinquents to be twice tried and punished for the same of-
fence . ," 21 the Court was to reason that, since the jurisdiction of
the two courts was concurrent, "the sentence of either court, either of
conviction or acquittal, might be pleaded in bar of the prosecution be-
fore the other ... ." 22 And later, by way of dictum in United States v.
the remaining five providing the protection within their common law. Note, Multiple
Prosecution: Federaliwi vs. Individual Rights, 20 U. OF FLA. L. REV. 355 n.1 (1968).
15. 1 ANNALs OF CONG. 753 (1789). A delegate had requested that the provision be
changed such that the words "by any law of the United States . .." be inserted.
16. See generally Harrison, supra note 2, at 309-10.
17. E.g., U. S. CONsT. amend. X.
18. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 169 (Scott ed. 1898) (Hamilton).
19. Newman, supra note 6, at 257.
20. 18 U. S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).
21. Id. at 6..
22. Id. at 31.
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Furlong," the Court was again to draw on the "universal maxim" of
double jeopardy. It stated: "... . and there can be no doubt that the
plea of autrefoits acquit would be good, in any civilized state, though
resting on a prosecution instituted in courts of any other civilized
state .... 24
Later, state court decisions were to serve to point up the problem. 5
But it was not until the decisions of Fox v. Ohio,2 6 United States v.
Marigold,'I and Moore v. Illinois,28 in the period 1847-52, that the Su-
preme Court was to lend its support to the conceptual framework of
a dual sovereignty doctrine, as advanced by the states. The Court was
to assert that each citizen owes "allegiance to two sovereigns, and may
be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of either." 2 The
.overriding considerations for this rationale, it has been suggested, was
simply the balancing of the interests of two governments in a period of
our nation when the slavery question and state sovereignty doctrine were
politico-legal questions embroiled in an emotional setting.30 With the
questions of the federal system's survival at stake, individualistic or
libertarian interests must have been rather insignificant considerations.
The limited value as precedent of these cases for the double sovereignty
doctrine of Bartkus and Abbate can be emphasized when one looks
further at the Moore decision. In Moore, the plaintiff was indicted un-
der the criminal code of Illinois for secreting and harboring a fugitive
black slave, while a federal statute also dealt with the same conduct. In
dealing with this, the most politically explosive issue of the times, the
majority was to assume the "correctness" of the doctrine that "a slave
owner was clothed with the entire authority, in every State in the Union,
to seize and recapture his slave." 31 Given this context of the antebellum
period, it would appear inevitable that the federal and state govern-
23. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820) (the defendants were indicted for robbery
committed at sea). For application of the doctrine in multijurisdictional situations see
the discussion in Note, Double Prosecution By State and Federal Governments: Another
Exercise in Federalism, 80 HAtv. L. Rv. 1538, 1543 (1967).
24. 18 U. S. (5 Wheat.) at 197 (1820).
25. See, e.g., Harlan v. People, 1 Douglass 207 (Mich. 1843); State v. Randall, 2
Aikens 89 (Vt. 1827).
26. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 470 (1847).
27. 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850).
28. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13 (1852).
29. Id. at 20.
30. Harrison, supra note 16, at 313. The author feels that the "individual was only a
sacrificed pawn in a game that had higher stakes-the survival or demise of the federal
union." Id. See also Newman, supra note 6, at 260.
31. Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 439 (1847) (McLean, J., dissenting).
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ments would be recognized as distinct and independent entities. Justice
McLean was to dissent to the Court's rationale:
There is no principle better established by the common law,
none more fully recognized in the federal and State constitutions,
than that an individual shall not be put in jeopardy twice for the
same offence. This, it is true, applies to respective governments;.
but its spirit applies with equal force against double punishment,
for the same act, by a State and the federal government. 32
United States v. Lanza3  in 1922 was the first case in which the Su-
preme Court formally held that successive prosecutions could be enter-
tained for the same offense in federal and state courts. For in the Lanza
case, a federal conviction for violation of the Volstead Act was upheld
after the defendant was convicted by the state of Washington for manu-
facturing intoxicating liquor.- Yet, when considered in the context of
legislative history of the Volstead Act and the eighteenth amendment
little is offered to justify Lanza.35 In addition, it must be remembered
that both the Act and the amendment have ceased to exist in modern
law. But it was in Lanza where Chief Justice Taft was to offer the clas-
sic formulation of the dual sovereignty framework as cited by Bartkus
and Abbate:
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from dif-
ferent sources, capable of dealing with the same subject-matter
within the same territory. Each government in determining what
shall be an offense against its peace and dignity is exercising its
own sovereignty, not that of the other.
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and
state sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of
both and may be punished by each.36
THE Bartkus AND Abbate DEcisioNs
In the context of this historical development, on March 30, 1959, the
Supreme Court in Bartkus v. Illinois and its companion case Abbate v.
United States dealt with the problem of dual prosecutions by federal
32. 55 U.S. at 20.
33. 260 U.S. 377 (1922).
34. Id.
35. See generally Newman supra note 6, at 262.
36. 260 U.S. at 382. For more detailed criticisms of the Lanza decision see Grant,
supra note 8.
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and state governments. In Bartkus, the defendant having been tried un-
der the National Bank Robbery Act 7 for the robbery of a federally
insured Illinois savings and loan association, was acquitted in a federal
district court. Three weeks later, he was indicted by an Illinois grand
jury on substantially the same evidence for violating the Illinois Rob-
bery Act. 8 Bartkus was subsequently convicted and sentenced to life
imprisonment under the Illinois Habitual Criminal Act.3 The Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed and certiorari was granted to the United States
Supreme Court.40 The Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision held that since
the state prosecution was not a sham, the fourteenth amendment's due
process clause did not prohibit the state reprosecution of an offense
arising out of the same act after an acquittal in a federal court.
In Abbate, the defendants had pleaded guilty to conspiring to dyna-
mite facilities of a telephone company during an extended labor dispute,
and were sentenced to three months imprisonment under a state statute.
In a federal district court, the defendants were subsequently convicted a
second time for a conspiracy, based upon the same acts, to destroy
integral parts of a United States communication system.4 The Supreme
Court held, as it had in Lanza, that a state conviction followed by a
federal conviction for the same act is not barred by the double jeopardy
clause of the fifth amendment.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter speaking for the majority in Bartkus and Mr.
Justice Brennan in Abbate were to offer the contentions that the state-
federal reprosecutions did not respectively violate either the fourteenth
amendment in Bartkus or the fifth in Abbate. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
concluded that "[p]recedent, experience, and reason" supported his
conclusion that the defendant had not been deprived of due process
through dual prosecutions.42 In doing so he placed the greatest re-
liance: (1) upon the principle that the Bill of Rights was not to be
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and thereby made ap-
plicable to the States; (2) upon the rule of Palko v. Connecticut;43 and
(3) upon the rationale of Lanza. In addition, Mr. Justice Frankfurter
37. 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1964) (a federal criminal offense occurs with the robbery of a
federally insured banking institution).
38. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 501 (1957) (repealed 1961).
39. Id. § 602 (repealed 1963).
40. People v. Bartkus, 7 IMI. 2d 138, 130 N.E.2d 187 (1955), affd by an equally divided
court without opinion, 355 U.S. 281, rehearing granted, 356 U.S. 969 (1958).
41. Abbate v. United States, 247 F.2d 410 (5th Cir. 1957), cert. granted, 355 U.S. 902
(1957).
42. 359 U.S. at 139.
43. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
1970]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
argued that to overrule this precedent required extremely persua-
sive reasons which he felt were not of merit. He felt on the contrary
that two policy considerations in support of federalism made it nec-
essary to uphold a dual sovereignty doctrine: (1) there is danger
of federal encroachment on state enforcement, particularly in reference
to civil rights;4 and (2) substantial difficulty could arise in determin-
ing when one offense could bar another because of their similarity.4
Mr. Justice Brennan dealt with the problem in an almost identical man-
ner. In relying on the Lanza decision and its rationale that the same
act produced two offenses and therefore Abbate could not be put in
jeopardy for the "same" offense, Brennan also spoke of the fact that
federal law enforcement might be hindered if prior state prosecutions
precluded subsequent federal action.
Mr. Justice Black, as noted already, offered in dissent, three counter-
ing arguments to the reasoning in Bartkus and Abbate: (1) the fifth
amendment should be applied through the fourteenth to the states;
(2) allowing reprosecutions would violate the "concept of ordered
liberty" 4' since it would be in strict contravention of the "universal
maxim" that had become so fundamental to our western legal tradi-
tion; and (3) the dual sovereignty doctrine ought to be rejected as a
fiction that endangered individual rights while placing an unjustified
emphasis on the need to protect the state and federal interests involved.
He stated also:
The Court apparently takes the position that a second trial for
the same act is somehow less offensive if one of the trials is con-
ducted by the Federal Government and the other by a State.
Looked at from the standpoint of the individual who is being
prosecuted, this notion is too subtle for me to grasp. If double
punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less for two "Sovereigns"
to inflict it than for one.47
THE WEAKNESS OF Bartkus AND Abbate: FEDERALISM
v. THE INDIVIDUAL
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's first two principles were completely under-
44. Justice Frankfurter cited Screws v. United States, 352 U.S. 91 (1945) (defendant
charged with a lesser offense under 1948 Civil Rights Act when guilty of murder
under Georgia law). 359 U.S. at 132.
45. See Pontikes, supra note 8 at 702. See generally Kirchheimer, The Act, the
Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513 (1949).
46. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
47. 359 U.S. at 155.
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mined when, on June 23, 1969, the Supreme Court of the United States,
in Benton v. Maryland" overruled Palko v. Connecticut and held that
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the fifth amendment is applicable to
the States through the fourteenth amendment. In addition, Mr. Jus-
tice Harlan in dissent, was to accurately reflect Benton as part of a
"so far unchecked march towards 'incorporating' much, if not all, of
the Federal Bill of Rights into the Due Process Clause." 49 This was a
continuation of the process of "selective incorporation" into the four-
teenth amendment of the specific guarantees enumerated in the first
eight amendments as prohibitions against the states. The Court has
found this necessary "to maintain ... a fair and enlightened system of
justice . . . 1o For the Court in a redefinition of its constitutional
philosophy has placed libertarian interests above institutional considera-
tions.r' It has accomplished this by specifically incorporating certain
Bill of Rights guarantees, for instance, the exclusionary rule of the
fourth amendment, 2 the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amend-
ment, 3 the right to confrontation, 4 effective assistance of counsel, 5
speedy trial,"6 and cruel and unusual punishment.8 7
It can be seen that the continued recognition of Mr. Justice Frank-
furter's rationale in Bartkus has been weakened in three basic respects.
First, the overruling of Palko and the incorporation of the double
jeopardy provision into the fourteenth amendment has reflected a
change in constitutional philosophy from institutional considerations to
greater protections for the individual. 5 Second, the prevailing analysis
of the principal precedents for Bartkus and Abbate, Lanza and three
pre-civil war cases, has challenged the validity of those decisions. And
finally, the dual sovereignty theory and its policy of overemphasizing
institutional interests while correspondingly underemphasizing the
48. 395 U.S. 784 (1969).
49. Id. at 808.
50. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. at 325.
51. For the earlier lower court decisions viewing the Benton decision as predictable
see, United States v. Wilkins, 348 F.2d 844, 853-54 (1965); People v. Eggleston, 255
Cal. App. 2d 337, 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 104 (1967).
52. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
53. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
54. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
55. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
56. Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
57. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
58. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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defendant's interests, has come increasingly under attack as being
conceptually imprecise as well as patently unjust. 9
In analysis of this latter point, the multiple prosecution rationale will
be examined in some detail to see its relevance to the state-federal re-
prosecution problem and determine if the arguments supporting the
rationale are of sufficient merit to be justified in the Bartkus-Abbate
situation. Next, the erosion of the dual sovereignty doctrine will be
emphasized, and institutional considerations will be discussed in de-
termining which interests are in need of protection in the event that
Bartkus and Abbate are overruled.
MULTIPLE PROSECUTION PROHIBITION: RATIONALE
As Mr. Justice Black has pointed out,"' while some writers have
emphasized the inherent injustice of two punishments and others have
cited the dangers to the innocent, the recurring theme of opposition
to multiple prosecutions has simply been that it is wrong for the indi-
vidual to "'be brought into Danger for the same Offense more than
once.' " "' Beyond this, the double jeopardy prohibition is premised
upon fundamental notions of fairness. It is sustained by society's need
to protect both the individual defendant, and the trial as an institution. 2
In addition, public policy militates against the use of successive prose-
cutions.0 3
From the viewpoint of the protection of the accused, the doctrine's
guarantee is necessary in order to protect the accused from the mental
anxiety and social disabilities which are inherent in multiple prosecu-
tion. It is necessary to thwart any attempted use of multiple prosecu-
tions as a tool of the prosecution to punish or harass the defendant.6 4
In addition, the use of multiple prosecutions places the defendant at
an unfair advantage in regard to the state, while also increasing the
possibility of convicting an innocent man.s
59. Note, supra note 23 at 1542.
60. In Bartkus, Mr. Justice Black offered a masterful dissent which discussed the
history of the double jeopardy doctrine, the effect of successive prosecutions on the
accused, and the availability of federal preemption as a tool to mitigate any administra-
tive problems created by an overruling of the Lanza rule. 359 U.S. at 150.
61. 359 U.S. at 155 citing 2 Hawkins, supra note 7, at 377.
62. See Fisher, supra note 2, at 592-94.
63. Note, supra note 14, at 362.
64. Note, supra note 23, at 1540.
65. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957). See also Note, Statutory
Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses: New Life for a Moribund Constitutional
Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339 (1956).
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Other writers have suggested that the guarantee is necessary pri-
marily "to furnish essential respect and support for the judicial process." 6
The thinking being that if the trial is to serve as a supposed model of
fairness, then it is essential that the initial criminal trial not be disre-
garded. It is important also that the double jeopardy prohibition serve
as the vehicle to uphold "the social value of certainty." 67 For to al-
low multiple prosecutions is to undermine the definitive nature of the
judicial process,68 and subject the defendant and society to uncertainty.
Still further, it has been urged that there are paramount public policy
considerations to be served by a prohibition against multiple prosecu-
tions. "First, multiple trials are expensive." 69 Second, the need "of
bringing litigation to an expeditious conclusion is frustrated." 70 Third,
multiple prosecutions are contrary to prevailing criminal theory which
reasons that society is best served when the aim of the criminal law
is the protection of society, the deterrence of future crime and re-
habilitation. Multiple prosecutions, instead, tend to serve a retributive
or revengeful aim. In the same context, multiple prosecution and its
subjection of the defendant to multiple punishment decreases chances
of rehabilitation by increasing feelings of alienation and hostility of an
offender toward society. In addition, it undermines the objectives of
probation and parole.1 Fourth, it has been suggested that other con-
stitutional guarantees are subject to weakening, such as the right to a
speedy trial, protection from stale charges, and the validity of criminal
statutes of limitations. 72
In conclusion it would appear these considerations would be ap-
plicable to multiple prosecutions whether in the same jurisdiction or in
successive state-federal prosecutions. Looked at from the standpoint
of the individual defendant any distinctions caused by these differing
contexts would appear to disregard the need for his protection.
EROSION OF DUAL SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS PRACTICAL APPROACH
The initial erosion of the dual sovereignty approach came in 1960 in
Elkins v. United States,78 and in 1962, in Mapp v. Ohio,74 when the
66. Fisher, supra note 2, at 593.
67. id.
68. Id.
69. Note, supra note 14, at 362.
70. Id.
71. See D. DREssLu, PRACnTICE TmORY OF PROBATION AND PARoLE (1959).
72. Note, supra note 14, at 362.
73. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
74. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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Court ruled that when a claim of unreasonable search and seizure has
been successfully asserted, evidence illegally seized by officials in one
jurisdiction must be excluded from the other jurisdiction's prosecution.
Dual sovereignty collapsed in the fifth amendment self-incrimination
area in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'r,75 for there the Court over-
turned a decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey which held
that New Jersey could constitutionally compel a witness to give testi-
mony which might have been used in a federal prosecution against him.
The Court found the whipsawing of a witness under the laws of either
sovereignty to be constitutionally repugnant. More important to this
discussion is the rejection by Murphy of the Bartkus spirit, i.e., po-
tential antagonism between the two governments in a federal system.
Rather the Court pointed out that this now is an "age of 'cooperative
federalism,' where the Federal and State Governments are waging a
united front against many types of criminal activity." 76 Two years
later Justices Harlan and Stewart announced that Murphy, at least in
the area of self-incrimination, had "abolished the 'two sovereignties'
rule .... " "
In reference to the practical considerations, offered by the majority
in Bartkus and Abbate, it is not essential to the appropriate balance of
the federal system that a "dual sovereignty" philosophy of law enforce-
ment be maintained. In Bartkus, the Court had expressed the fear that
federal prosecution for minor offenses would preclude more harsh state
penalties for the same acts and thereby "the result would be a shocking
and untoward deprivation of the historic right and obligation of the
States to maintain peace and order within their confines." 78 But this
was to rely on the "unwarranted assumption that State and Nation will
seek to subvert each other's laws." 79 In fact, the cases are replete with
co-operative efforts of the state and federal governments in the field
of law enforcement.80
Concerning the institutional interests that are in need of protection,
it has been suggested, that the practical necessity of defending state and
federal interests, and the overcoming of difficulties that might arise by
75. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
76. Id. at 55-56.
77. Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 250 (1966). See Note, supra note 23, at 1547-49.
This excellent analysis offers distinctions between Elkins and Murphy and the suc-
cessive prosecution issue.
78. 359 U.S. 121, 137.
79. Id. at 156 (Black, J., dissenting).
80. State v. Fletcher, 15 Ohio Misc. 336, -, 240 N.E.2d 905, 911 (Ct. C.P. 1968).
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allowing one prosecution, can be accomplished without multiple fed-
eral, state prosecutions. The analysis has been that because the federal
interest in areas of concurrent jurisdiction are usually only supple-
mentary to state law enforcement it is unlikely that criminal law en-
forcement would be disadvantaged.8' This is true, except in one major
area, civil rights, where federal prosecutions have often been neces-
sary in order to protect national interests.2 Although the Court has
fostered the view that the federal government should protect through
law enforcement and civil rights legislation constitutionally guaran-
teed rights, and therefore might be hesitant to allow any situation where
federal interests might be undercut, 3 it would appear that there are
means to afford the protection.
On the whole, then, the interests of the state and federal law enforce-
ment officials are not in conflict since crime is an offense not against
a sovereign but society. It is society that is offended by the crime not
the sovereign, and prosecution is undertaken by the government as
"protector" of that society.8 4 This is the only acceptable view of the
function of criminal prosecution and is a view that is inconsistent with
a dual sovereignty theorys 5 It would follow that the doctrine must
give way, for whether the federal or the state government initiates the
prosecution would seem to be immaterial, except in the civil rights area.
This is the line of thought of a recent decision which has forseen
the demise of the Bartkus-Abbate rule on facts almost indistinguishable
from Bartkus. The decision was State v. Fletcher.86 The arguments pre-
sented there in conclusion seem relevant to this discussion:
This court is undismayed by this humanitarian trend. For the
heart of federalism does not lie in the enforcement of a shallow,
abstract and automatic line of demarcation between the state and
federal sovereignties. Rather, it lies in the recognition of the fact
that an individual is entitled to have his freedom protected by
both the state in which he resides and the nation to which he
pledges his allegiance, and in the understanding that when one
sovereignty fails to provide him justice, he may look to the other
for the relief which the constitution guarantees him. When such
a conception of federalism has been achieved, our constitutional
81. Note, supra note 23, at 1565.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
83. Note, supra note 23, at 1565.
84. Note, supra note 14, at 363. See also Harrison, supra note 2, at 327.
85. id.
86. 240 N.E.2d 905 (1968).
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promises will have been fulfilled and, perhaps surprisingly, our
law enforcement systems will be more effective, both individually
and in cooperation with each other.8 7
But although Mr. Justice Frankfurter was in "little sympathy" 88
with the result reached in Bartkus and Abbate, still the supposed danger
to the federal system, as noted in Fletcher, was the alternative ground
for the decision. The Court, it is felt, emphasized federalism as an end
in itself, and not as a means of securing and protecting individual rights.
It is a question of the Court focusing on the instrumentality's protection
instead of the rights of the individual that the instrumentality was cre-
ated to protect s9 It is Mr. Justice Black's position, in dissent, which
appears to offer the solution of maintaining the instrumentality, the
federal system, while preserving the individual's rights. He suggests the
prohibition of multiple prosecution coupled with use of federal pre-
emption to protect national interests.
CONCLUSION
Although the individual's constitutional rights as limited by Bartkus
and Abbate might be restored by the use of administrative discretion 0
or state, federal "barring statutes," 91 still a proper interpretation of the
fifth amendment guarantees by the Court is the only way to insure
that the defendant's rights are protected. "Selective pre-emption" would
appear to offer the solution to the problem by allowing federal of-
ficials to obtain a stay of a state prosecution on the ground that a fed-
eral trial is deemed necessary to protect national interests. This would
87. Id. at 912-13.
88. "The greatest self-restraint is necessary when that federal system yields results
with which a court is in little sympathy." Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 138 (1959).
89. See Neuman, Federalism and Freedom: A Critique, in FEDERALiSM MATURE AND
EMERGENT 44 (1955).
90. No federal case should be tried when there has already been a state
prosecution for substantially the same act or acts without the United States
Attorney first submitting a recommendation to the Assistant Attorney
General in the department.
News Notes, Double jeopardy, 27 U.S.L.W. 2509 (April 7, 1959).
91. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.10(1) (a) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Statutes have
been enacted in 19 states, Note supra note 14, at 360, n.57. Alaska's provision has been
suggested as representative:
When an act charged is within the jurisdiction of the United States,
another State, or a territory, as well as of this State, a conviction or ac-
quittal in the former is a bar to the prosecution for it in this state. AAsKA
STAT. § 12.20.010 (1962).
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retain the primary responsibility of the states for law enforcement,
but would allow for protection from local prejudice and incompetency
in prosecution, as well as bringing the full resources of the federal gov-
ernment into play in cases of supreme national interest, particularly
civil rights. Although initially some resentment might be felt, such a
system would induce more cooperation, because conflicting interests
would be removed.
Such a policy of federal pre-emption could be implemented by legis-
lative action or through the use of the federal government's power to
enjoin state proceedings to prevent "irreparable injury to a national in-
terest."9 2 With this protection of primary federal interests, plus the
retention of the state's role as the primary law enforcement mechanism,
there would appear to be no justification for the retention of the multi-
ple prosecution rule and the legal fiction of dual sovereignty upon
which it is based. This protection, in addition to the extreme criticisms
of the Bartkus and Abbate decisions, the attacks on its precedent, the
libertarian trend of the Court, and the erosion of the tenets of a dual
sovereignty are significant reasons justifying the overruling of those de-
cisions. The Court in accepting these arguments and overruling Bartkus
and Abbate will return to the protection that the "universal maxim" of
the common law and the fifth amendment originally sought to afford
the criminal defendant, that is, he should not be placed in jeopardy
twice for the same act.
RAY C. STONER.
92. See 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964) and Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S.
220, 225-26 (1967) (statute does allow an injunction when it is sought by the United
States to prevent "irreparable injury to a national interest"). Note, supra note 23,
at 1555-56.
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